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European Economic and Monetary Union 
The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is part of the European Union (EU), and 
at the same it is an instrument aimed at achieving stable economic growth and low inflation, which 
is the main objective of the EU economic policy. The European EMU is based on a single 
monetary and coordinated economic policy. This single monetary policy would be impossible 
without the attainment of a coordinated fiscal policy and without the free movement of capital, 
goods, and services within the single European market. The foreign exchange regime is a major 
problem of the EMU. Before its accession to the EU, each country has the right to choose its 
own foreign exchange regime as long as it contributes to the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria. 
After acceding to the EU, monetary policy becomes a matter of common interest. In compliance 
with the Treaty establishing the European Community (ECT), the European Commission (EC) 
has bound the adoption of the Acquis Communautaire for the EMU with three clearly 
outlined phases (European Commission, II/384/99-EN, 1999): 
· A pre-accession phase, which is the phase that Bulgaria is in at the time being; 
· An accession phase, which covers the period from the accession to the adoption of the 
single currency. During this phase each member-country of the Union will have the status 
of a country with derogated participation in the Euro-zone and will have to observe the 
targets of the economic and monetary union; 
· A final phase of Euro-zone membership, which depends on the attainment of the 
Maastricht criteria and on a country’s capability to meet the conditions for adopting the 
single currency. This capability is established on the basis of inspections as per Art.122 
(2), testifying to the high degree of stable convergence (European Commission, 
II/384/99-EN, 1999) in compliance with the criteria described in Art. 121 (1) of the 
ECT. 
During the first pre-accession phase, which is of particular interest for Bulgaria, the countries are 
to carry out economic reforms in order to achieve economic stability and high economic growth. 
Accordingly, they pursue a policy conducive to the attainment of the Copenhagen criteria, at the 
same time harmonizing their legislation in compliance with the requirements for membership in the 
EMU with derogated participation in the Euro-zone. According to the Copenhagen criteria, the 
country willing to accede to the EU should, as early as this stage, adhere to the objectives of the 
political, economic, and monetary union. In more concrete terms, the pre-accession phase raises 
the following requirements (European Commission, II/384/99-EN, 1999): 
· Completion of the deregulation efforts concerning the movement of capital – Art. 56 of 
the ECT; 
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· Ban on any kind of direct public sector financing by the Central Bank (CB), as well as a 
ban on any privileged access to financial institutions on the part of the public sector – Art. 
101 and Art 102 of the ECT; 
· Harmonization of the Central Bank Act, in this particular case the Bulgarian Central Bank 
Act, with the ECT in compliance with Art. 108 and 109. 
The pre-accession phase does not require that the countries, candidates for EU accession, should 
observe the Maastricht criteria as they are mandatory only for the EU member countries. The 
candidate countries in the process of accession are obliged to meet the Copenhagen criteria only. 
Nevertheless, observing the Maastricht criteria is important, because it secures the stability of the 
countries, which have applied for EU membership. 
The Maastricht criteria are divided into two categories: criteria concerning price approximation, 
and fiscal criteria. The first type of criteria refers to achieving a low inflation rate and low interest 
rates, whereas the second type of criteria imposes restrictions on the budget deficit and the 
government debt. The attainment of low inflation and a balanced budget excludes abrupt 
fluctuations in the balance of payments, i.e. in the movement of goods, services, and capital, and 
consequently leads to the stability of the foreign exchange rate, which is the fifth Maastricht 
criterion. The ability to meet all the Maastricht criteria prepares the EU member-countries for 
accession to the Euro-zone. 
The Regular Report on the Progress Made by Bulgaria 
The Regular Report emphasizes that upon its accession to the EMU, Bulgaria will have the status 
of a country with derogated participation in compliance with Article 122 of the ECT. The 
requirements, which Bulgaria has to observe with respect to the EMU, are those typical for the 
pre-accession phase. The comparative analysis of the current state of the Bulgarian legal 
framework and the requirements of the ECT as regards the independence of the Central Bank 
indicate that, at the time being, Bulgaria has achieved a significant degree of harmonization of its 
legislation with the requirements of the EMU Acquis communautaire, taking into consideration the 
pre-accession stage the country is in at present. 
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Independence of the Central Bank 
Comparison between the ECT and the Bulgarian Legislation 
 
ECT Requirements 
 
 
Bulgarian Legislation 
 
Art.108 and Art. 109 of the Treaty for 
the Establishment of the European 
Community and Art. 7 of Protocol 3 
concerning the Charter of the European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the 
European Central Bank (ECB) prevent a 
Central Bank or individual members of its 
bodies, who are in a decision-making 
capacity, from being given instructions or 
being influenced in any way by the national 
government, the European Union 
institutions or any other authorities.  
 
 
According to the Bulgarian National Bank 
Act (BNBA) the BNB is independent from 
any government agencies and authorities. 
Art. 44 of the BNBA explicitly states that the 
BNB is independent from any instructions 
issued by the Council of Ministers or any other 
government agencies while performing its 
intrinsic activity. The fact that in accordance 
with Art. 3 of the BNBA, the BNB and the 
Council of Ministers inform each other about 
their intentions and actions when the general 
outlines of monetary and lending policy are 
determined, does not infringe in any way the 
independence of the CB; this only creates the 
possibility to achieve better coordination 
between the autonomous CB and the agencies 
of the executive branch of power.  
The independence of the CB does not rule 
out, on the contrary – it presupposes the 
transparency of the Bank’s activity 
through presenting annual reports. An 
example to this effect are the annual 
reports of the ECB on the performance of 
the ESCB submitted to the European 
Parliament and the European Council. 
Art.1, Para. 2 of the BNBA requires that the 
BNB report to the National Assembly. 
Regardless of the fact that the BNB is 
required to report to the National Assembly, 
the principle of the CB independence is not 
abused, because the parliamentary control 
carried out during question time excludes any 
mandatory instructions being given to the CB 
in connection with the policy it pursues and the 
work it does. Art. 50 of the BNBA requires 
that the BNB submit a report about the 
preceding period twice a year, and Art. 51 
requires that the CB submit an auditor’s report 
and BNB budget to the National Assembly.  
Art. 101 of the ECT and Art. 21 of 
Protocol 3 forbid the extension of an 
overdraft or any other type of credit to the 
central government by the CB. The direct 
purchase of government debt instruments 
by the CB is also forbidden.  
As per Art. 45 of the BNBA, the BNB 
cannot extend loans in any form to the 
government or government institutions with the 
exception of loans at the expense of SDR 
purchased from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), which are granted on a decision 
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by the CB is also forbidden.  made by the BNB’s Board of Directors.  
Art. 102 of the ECT provides that no 
privileged access should be given to the 
central government, the municipalities or 
other public institutions to any financial 
institution. 
There is no Act in the Bulgarian legislation 
providing for such privileged access on the 
part of the Bulgarian government, the 
municipalities, or any other public institutions 
to the financial institutions. 
Art.14.2 of Protocol 3 concerning the 
Charter of the ESCB and the ECB 
requires that the term of office of the 
Governor should not be shorter than a 5 
years’ period of time. The Governor can 
be ousted from office only when he no 
longer meets the conditions and is 
incapable of performing his duties, or 
when he is accused of mismanagement or 
poor administration.  
BNBA (Art. 12 and Art. 14, Art. 17) refers 
to the election and independence of the Board 
of Directors of the BNB. It envisages that the 
Governor and Vice Governors of the BNB 
shall be elected by the National Assembly, 
their term of office being of a 6 years’ 
duration. The Governor and the rest of the 
members sitting on the Board of Directors can 
be removed from office before their term of 
office has expired if the conditions, which have 
given rise to their election have been infringed, 
as well as when they fail to take part in three 
or more consecutive meetings of the Board of 
Directors without a sufficiently good reason, 
or when a significant infringement of their 
official duties occurs, either through action or 
inaction, which prevents them from fulfilling the 
tasks they have been entrusted with by the 
BNBA (Art. 14 of the BNBA). 
Source: Regular Report on the Progress Made by Bulgaria, 2000 
 
After the exchange rate was pegged to the German mark within the framework of the Currency 
Board arrangement, Bulgaria has marked significant progress in abating inflation by curbing the 
inflation rate, achieving a widely balanced government budget and low and relatively stable 
interest rates. In order to retain the results achieved and to avoid the risk of speculative attacks 
and infringement of the financial discipline, Bulgaria would like to preserve the Currency Board 
agreement up to the moment it accedes to the EU, and possibly to the time it joins the EMU. A 
similar strategy is pursued by the other countries practising a fixed exchange rate regime or a 
currency board arrangement which have applied for EU membership, such as Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania. In this respect the Regular Report on Bulgaria underlines that Bulgaria maintains a 
Currency Board arrangement and observes a strict monetary policy, foreign exchange and fiscal 
discipline, ruling out any direct financing of the public sector on the part of the Central Bank. The 
Regular Report on Bulgaria pays special attention to the progress made with respect to economic 
policy coordination, the flexibility of its fiscal policy and the mechanisms concerning the 
management and control of expenditures. It explicitly stresses upon the fact that the administrative 
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capacity of the BNB, the Ministry of Finance, and the Council of Ministers has been enhanced. 
The overall assessment given to Bulgaria with respect to the application of the Acquis in the EMU 
sphere is that “satisfactory progress” has been achieved. 
Comparison between Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, and Slovakia 
Bulgaria Latvia Lithuania Slovakia 
Bulgaria has marked 
satisfactory progress 
with respect to the EMU 
Acquis implementation, 
including also economic 
policy coordination, fiscal 
policy flexibility, and 
mechanisms for better 
management and control 
of expenditures. Bulgaria 
maintains a Currency 
Board arrangement and 
observes strict monetary 
policy, foreign exchange 
and fiscal discipline, and 
independence of the 
monetary authorities, and 
rules out any direct 
financing of the public 
sector on the part of the 
Central Bank. 
 
Latvia has adopted a 
significant part of 
the Acquis 
concerning the EMU. 
The Latvian 
legislation is 
harmonized with the 
Acquis requirements 
for a ban on direct 
financing of the public 
sector by the Central 
Bank and privileged 
access of the public 
sector to financial 
institutions. The 
Latvian Central Bank 
Act guarantees the 
independence of the 
CB.  
 
Lithuania has 
adopted a 
significant part 
of the Acquis 
concerning the 
EMU. Further 
progress is 
necessary with 
respect to the 
independence of 
the Central Bank 
and the members 
of its Board of 
Directors, as well 
as in relation to 
the ban on direct 
financing of the 
public sector by 
the Central Bank.  
A considerable 
effort is needed to 
harmonize the 
country’s 
legislation with the 
Acquis concerning 
the EMU and with 
respect to the 
independence of the 
Central Bank and the 
ban on direct 
financing of the public 
sector.  
The legislation of the 
country does not 
contain an explicit 
provision for 
privileged access of 
the public authorities 
to funding by 
financial institutions. 
Source: Regular Report on Bulgaria, 2000 
 
The comparison between the Regular Reports on Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia – 
countries from the Helsinki group, three of which have introduced currency board or fixed 
exchange rate arrangements – indicates that Bulgaria and Latvia have registered the most positive 
progress with respect to the harmonization of their respective legislation with the Acquis 
concerning the EMU at the pre-accession stage. The regular reports note that these countries 
have achieved the independence of their central banks and that funding of the public sector on the 
part of the central banks has been ruled out. Unlike them, Lithuania and Slovakia have not met 
the requirements of the Acquis concerning the EMU. Irrespective of all this, the Regular Report 
gives Bulgaria a modest evaluation summarized by the expression “satisfactory progress”. 
The comparison of the concrete recommendations contained in the Regular Reports on each of 
the four countries confirms the fact that the satisfactory achievements made by Bulgaria have 
resulted in a considerably smaller number of recommendations about the adoption of the Acquis 
in relation to the EMU. 
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Recommendations about the adoption of the Acquis in relation to the EMU 
Bulgaria Latvia Lithuania Slovakia 
What is needed is: 
· To amend the 
BNBA 
concerning the 
composition of 
its Board of 
Directors; 
· To improve the 
comparability 
and quality of 
budget data. 
What is needed is: 
· To bring the 
definitions 
about the 
consolidated 
government 
debt in line 
with EU 
requirements. 
What is needed is: 
· To secure the 
personal 
independence of the 
members of the 
Board of Directors 
of the CB; 
· To modify the 
reporting procedure 
before Parliament 
with a view to 
consolidating the 
independence of the 
CB; 
· To pass a law which 
forbids the direct 
funding of the public 
sector by the CB. 
What is needed is an 
amendment to the 
Central Bank Act 
with the purpose of: 
· To discontinue 
the direct short-
term financing of 
the government; 
· To secure the 
complete 
functional, 
institutional, 
personal, and 
financial 
independence of 
the CB. 
Source: Regular Report on Bulgaria, 2000 
 
What impresses here is that the most serious recommendations about the independence of the 
Central Bank are addressed to Lithuania and Slovakia. The recommendations addressed to 
Bulgaria and Latvia are mostly of a technical nature. This is an additional proof to the fact that 
Bulgaria has achieved a better degree of harmonization between its legislation and the 
requirements of the Acquis at the pre-accession phase. 
The comparison between Bulgaria, Latvia, and Lithuania with respect to certain major economic 
indicators, which outline the economic stability of the countries and their potential capacity to 
maintain a fixed exchange rate or a currency board arrangement, shows that Bulgaria’s indicators 
about the budget deficit and the current account deficit as a percentage of the GDP are 
considerably more favourable than the same indicators for the other two countries (Table 1). In 
this respect the Regular Reports on Latvia and Lithuania recommend that their budget and current 
account deficits be decreased because if they are not brought under control, the stabilizing effect 
of the currency board or fixed exchange rate arrangement could be compromised. 
Table 1. Selected Indicators, 1999 
Indicators Bulgaria Latvia Lithuania 
Inflation – average annual percentage rate  2.6 2.4 0.8 
GDP in percentage terms 2.4 0.1 - 4.1 
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Budget deficit/GDP in percentage terms - 0.9 - 3.8 - 8.6 
Current account deficit/GDP in percentage terms - 5.3 - 10.6 - 11.2 
Source: the European Commission 
 
At the present stage Bulgaria is under no obligation to meet the Maastricht criteria with respect to 
the budget deficit (which require that it should not exceed 3% of the GDP) and the consolidated 
government debt (which should not exceed 60% of the GDP); nevertheless the ratio of the 
budget deficit to the GDP was about 1% in 1999, and about 1.5% in 2000. This year’s budget 
policy of Bulgaria is determined by the Government Programme and the IMF Agreement 
Programme of the country. The two programmes are focused on achieving fiscal stability through 
maintaining a broadly balanced government budget on the basis of an improved tax collection 
rate, control over non-interest related expenditures, and observing strict budget discipline. As to 
the consolidated government debt, the new Draft Bill on the government debt is based precisely 
on the EU definitions about the consolidated government debt and lays down requirements 
directed to its gradual decrease as a percentage of the GDP in accordance with the Maastricht 
criteria. 
Accession through the preservation of the Currency Board arrangement  
The standard scenario for joining the EMU envisages that a country should have already become 
a EU member country; it should have attained the Maastricht criteria, the countries operating 
under a currency board arrangement should have given it up it and should have restored the 
central bank’s instruments of monetary policy; they should also observe the ERM2 requirements, 
should have joined the Euro-zone and should have introduced the Euro as the domestic currency 
of their country. The accession to the EU is only possible after the Copenhagen criteria have been 
attained, whereas the membership in the EMU is based on the attainment of the Maastricht 
criteria. The standard approach to joining the EMU also requires that all EU member countries 
which subsequently join the EMU should have harmonized their legislation in the area of fiscal and 
monetary policy, should have achieved the coordination of their fiscal and monetary policy by 
observing the Maastricht criteria, and should maintain a balanced budget. 
Because of the fact that the requirement for joining the EMU were adopted before opening 
negotiations with the countries in transition, some of which operate under a currency board 
arrangement, the ECB and ECFIN were obliged to discuss some alternative approaches to 
joining the EMU and the Euro-zone. Subject to discussion were scenarios, which are an 
alternative to the standard scenario for joining the EMU and which make room for the possibility 
of accession directly with an existing currency board arrangement (this refers to countries such as 
Bulgaria and Estonia), or even by means of a unilateral euroization (Estonia does not rule out such 
a possibility) (Eesti Pank, Different Views on the Euro, 2000). The ECB has been considering the 
possibility of allowing deviations from the standard scenario for the countries operating under a 
currency board arrangement and permit the retention of the currency board during the ERM2 
period. In the opinion of the IMF, the currency board arrangement is a framework compatible 
with the ERM2 requirements (Keller, P. 2 000, Gulde, A-M., J. Kahkonen, P. Keller, 2000). At 
present, discussions are being held among economists about the possibility for officially allowing 
unilateral euroization as a theoretical opportunity for joining the Euro-zone. Euroization does not 
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necessarily mean that all criteria for the joining the EMU should have been met, and this 
respectively means that the full EMU membership is not mandatory either. 
It should be noted that under all possible scenarios the attainment of the Maastricht criteria, i.e. 
the nominal approximation, should be preceded or accompanied by genuine approximation. This 
means that the countries must have attained a level of real incomes that does not differ significantly 
from the average for the Euro-zone. 
The willingness, which Bulgaria has already expressed to preserve the currency board 
arrangement up to the time it joins the EU and possibly the EMU, means that the country will join 
the EU and will fulfill the Maastricht criteria without fully restoring its central bank and its 
respective instruments. If the currency board arrangement should be preserved, the ERM2 stage 
could be reduced to allowing for minimum foreign exchange fluctuations within the limits of +/- 
0.5%, which are permissible for instance in accordance with the BNBA, instead of the +/- 15% 
fluctuations permissible according to the ERM2. 
The possibility to preserve the currency board arrangement in the run-up to the accession to the 
EU and the EMU could be admitted not in principle, but for each country individually, depending 
on the fulfillment of concrete conditions and on the conclusion of an agreement about the central 
exchange rate in relation to the Euro. This possibility could be admitted first of all for well 
functioning currency board arrangements, in the absence of a markedly overvalued real exchange 
rate, in the conditions of a balanced exchange rate, flexible labour market, prudent fiscal policy, 
conservative policy in relation to foreign indebtedness, stable banking system, etc. (Keller, P. 2 
000, Gulde, A-M., J. Kahkonen, P. Keller, 2000).  
The IMF studies on the issues of Bulgaria’s competitiveness and the overvaluation of the real 
exchange rate come to the conclusion that the overvaluation of the real exchange rate observed 
from the middle of 1997 to the beginning of the year 2000 is insubstantial in comparison with the 
overvaluation in other countries in transition and can be linked to a large extent with the Balassa-
Samuelson effect (IMF Staff Country Report N00/54). This effect presupposes the more rapid 
growth of productivity in the sector of non-traded goods and services. Other factors, which could 
explain the overvaluation of the exchange rate are price liberalization, changes in the capital 
inflows, and government expenditures. As to minimum and average wages, in US dollar terms 
they are among the lowest in the region. For comparison’s sake, according to IMF data the 1999 
average wage in Bulgaria was $117, while it exceeded $290 in Estonia, $260 in Latvia, and $400 
in Poland. The average wage in Rumania was $128. Labour productivity growth in Bulgaria 
helped unit labour costs to remain unchanged in dollar terms during the last several years. If no 
drastic changes take place in the external environment that differ from the forecasts, and if 
Bulgaria continues to pursue its current reasonable economic policy, i.e. conservative fiscal policy 
and prudent incomes policy in state-owned enterprises, the stability of the currency board 
arrangement and the competitiveness of the economy will be preserved in the medium-term 
perspective (IMF Staff Country Report, N 00/53). 
The major challenge for every currency board arrangement is to secure and maintain a sufficiently 
large foreign exchange reserve that can guarantee its stable functioning. In meeting its needs for 
foreign financing, Bulgaria is strongly dependent on the influx of foreign investment (about 50% in 
1999) and on loans in support of the balance of payments from the international financial 
institutions (38% in 1999) (Ulgenerk, E. and L. Zlaoui, 2000). From the inception of the currency 
board arrangement to the present date, Bulgaria has been receiving financial assistance in support 
 9
of its balance of payments from the international financial institutions (IFI), the amount of which 
exceeds US$ 400 – 450 millions annually. 
The current account of Bulgaria’s balance of payments has marked a deficit ever since 1998 and 
this trend did not mark a reversal in the year 2000 either. In 1999 and 2000, direct foreign 
investments succeeded in financing the current account deficit, and in 2001 the expectations are 
for this deficit to decline below the 2000 level as a percentage of the GDP. In the medium term, 
with the completion of the privatization of large-scale enterprises, Bulgaria will find it increasingly 
more difficult to rely on big revenues from privatization deals. If the investment climate fails to 
improve so that fresh foreign investments can be attracted, it would be difficult to expect any 
significant growth in investments. Regardless of the fact that Bulgaria generates stability in the 
region, it is more likely that the process of attracting foreign investments in future will continue to 
depend on the unattractive image of the Balkans as a region of political, economic, and ethnic 
instability. 
During the next several years, with the completion of privatization deals and given the relatively 
large sums of money, amounting to more than US$ 1 billion a year, that will go to the repayment 
of the foreign debt, an adverse development of the balance of payments can be expected if the 
“green field” investments in the country remain at a modest level. In 2001, Bulgaria can still rely 
on the financial support of the IMF. A problem will occur in the following years, should the 
government fail to conclude a new agreement with IMF and the investment climate in the region 
fail to offer favourable conditions for the attraction of foreign investments. For a certain period of 
time, the larger foreign debt repayments could be financed out of the foreign exchange reserves of 
the BNB, but the stable functioning of the currency board arrangement would require that the 
reserves be preserved at a relatively high level. The country’s reliance on the financial support of 
the IFI or on the issuance of Euro-bonds or government securities is limited in the final analysis by 
the need to reduce the consolidated government debt and effect the approximation with the 
Maastricht criterion concerning the ratio between the consolidated government debt and the 
GDP. 
If Bulgaria decides to preserve its currency board arrangement in future, and also its current 
policy of strict financial discipline and incomes policy in state-owned enterprises, and if it 
continues to enjoy the necessary support on the part of the international financial institutions or 
succeeds in securing an alternative source of financing to fund its potential balance of payments 
deficits, it can be expected that the problems, which remain to be solved so that the currency 
board arrangement and the fixed exchange rate remain free of possible risk, are as follows: 
increasing the flexibility of the labour market, continuation of the processes of restructuring state-
owned enterprises, attraction of foreign investments and improvements in the management of the 
consolidated government debt. The issue concerned with the increase of the Bulgarian economy 
competitiveness and the establishment of a favourable climate for the attraction of foreign 
investors to the country is and will continue to be a key issue in the future, too. The solution of this 
issue will help the country overcome the difficulties with respect to the balance of payments and 
will inevitably create prerequisites for achieving higher economic growth rates and increasing real 
incomes, so that Bulgaria can shorten the distance between its current incomes level and the 
average real incomes level for the Euro-zone. What should be done to attain this purpose is to 
overcome the bureaucratic procedures, raise the quality of public services, and strictly implement 
the respective legislative acts. 
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